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Business Associations
by Stuart E. Walker*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys noteworthy decisions involving corporations and
limited liability companies issued by the Georgia Court of Appeals between
June 1, 2019, and May 31, 2020,1 summarizes an amendment to the Georgia
Business Corporation Code and an amendment to the Georgia Nonprofit
Corporation Code passed during the 2020 session of the General Assembly, and
says a brief word about the status of the new State-wide Business Court.2
As far as appellate decisions are concerned, this was a somewhat thin survey
period in the area of business associations. But the handful of cases treated here
have some lessons to teach the interested practitioner.
II. NOTEWORTHY CASES
A. The Georgia Court of Appeals Confirms that the Effective Date of a Change in
the Location of the Registered Office of a Georgia LLC—and thus a Change
in the Location of the LLC’s County of Residence for Purposes of Venue—
Cannot be Earlier than the Date that the Document Effecting the Change is
Marked “Received” by the Secretary of State.
Suppose an LLC wants to change the location of its registered office from
DeKalb County to Dawson County—thereby changing its county of residence
and the place where it is subject to venue in civil proceedings generally3—and
* Partner, Martin Snow, LLP. University of Georgia (A.B., magna cum laude, 2001); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia. I am grateful
to Andrew Wharton for his excellent help with this article.
1 For an analysis of business associations law during the prior survey period, see Stuart E.
Walker, Business Associations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 15 (2019).
2 During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court did not decide any appeals germane to
the subject matter of this survey article. As in previous years, I have omitted decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and orders of the federal district courts in the
Northern, Middle, and Southern Districts of Georgia.
3 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(1) (noting that a corporation is “deemed to reside . . . in the county of
this state where the corporation maintains its registered office”); O.C.G.A. § 14-11-1108(b) (“[T]he
residence of a limited liability company . . . shall be determined in accordance with Code Section
14-2-510 as though such limited liability company . . . were a corporation.”)
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it does so by filing an annual registration with the Secretary of State. 4 Suppose
also that the LLC signs and submits the annual registration document on
February 27, but it is not received and filed by the Secretary of State’s office
until March 15. Now imagine that, as fate would have it, on March 14 a lawsuit
is filed against the LLC in DeKalb County. Question: Based on the location of its
registered office, where does venue lie against the LLC—in DeKalb or Dawson
County? Answer: DeKalb County.
The Georgia Court of Appeals answered this question in Andrews v. Blue
Ridge NH Associates, LLC,5 a case in which the administrator of a decedent’s
estate brought tort and other claims6 against two corporations, two LLCs, a
limited partnership, and other defendants arising out of the alleged negligent
treatment of the decedent at two nursing home facilities. 7 The suit was filed on
March 14, 2018, in the State Court of DeKalb County, and venue was based on
the allegation that one of the LLCs—Blue Ridge NH Associates, LLC (Blue Ridge
Associates)—maintained its registered office in DeKalb County and that the
remaining defendants, together with Blue Ridge Associates, were joint
tortfeasors, making venue appropriate over all the defendants in DeKalb
County.8
Blue Ridge Associates and other defendants moved to dismiss the suit for
lack of venue in DeKalb County, arguing that Blue Ridge Associates had already
changed the location of its registered office from DeKalb County to Dawson
County as of February 27, 2018—15 days before the suit was filed.9 As support
for its argument, Blue Ridge Associates tendered to the trial court at an
evidentiary hearing a copy of the annual registration that it submitted to the
Secretary of State’s office to effect the change in location of its registered office.
The annual registration was signed by the manager of Blue Ridge Associates on
February 27, 2018, and it contained a notation near the top, stating information
on record as of: 2/27/2018.10 But a stamp on the registration reflected that it
was physically received by the Secretary of State’s office at 1:07 p.m. on March
15, 2018.11
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of venue, concluding
that the location of the registered office changed as of February 27 (the date the
See O.C.G.A. § 14-11-1103 (2020).
353 Ga. App. 75, 836 S.E.2d 197 (2019).
6 The plaintiff’s complaint alleged “claims for professional and ordinary negligence, premises
liability, violations of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, negligent hiring, training, and
supervision, and wrongful death.” Id. at 76, 836 S.E.2d at 200.
7 Id. at 75, 836 S.E.2d at 200.
8 Id. at 76–7, 836 S.E.2d at 200–01. See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(b) (“[J]oint tort-feasors . . . residing in
different counties [] may be subject to an action as such in the same action in any county in which
one or more of the defendants reside.”)
9 Andrews, 353 Ga. App. at 76, 836 S.E.2d at 201.
10 Id. at 84, 836 S.E.2d at 206.
11 Id.
4
5
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annual registration was signed and submitted) and that, as a result, Blue Ridge
Associates resided and was subject to venue in Dawson County (not DeKalb
County) at the time the suit was filed.12
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed that determination, holding that
the effective date of the change in location of the registered office from DeKalb
to Dawson County was March 15, 2018—one day after the suit was filed.13 The
court cited what it identified as the “clear and unambiguous language” of
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-206(e)(1),14 which provides, as a general rule, that “a
document accepted for filing [by the Secretary of State] is effective: [a]t the time
of filing on the date it is filed, as evidenced by the Secretary of State’s date and
time endorsement on the original document.”15 The court noted that the statute
contains two exceptions to that general rule,16 the first of which permits an LLC
to state the specific time of day that a document is to become effective “on the
date it is filed”17 and the second of which permits an LLC to designate a “delayed
effective time and date.”18 But the court underscored that “nothing in O.C.G.A.
§ 14-11-206 permits a party to specify an effective date for a filed document
that predates the date of filing with the Secretary of State.”19 Thus, under the
Georgia Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act), 20 the earliest date that a
document filed with the Secretary of State’s office can become effective is the
date on which it is marked filed (or received) by the Secretary of State’s office. 21
Consistent with a long line of precedent, the court of appeals reiterated that
a post-filing change in a party’s county of residence does not affect venue, which
is fixed as of the date that a complaint is filed, so long as the complaint and
summons are served on the party within a reasonable period of time. 22 As a
result of the reversal by the court of appeals, Blue Ridge Associates and the
other defendants were subject to venue in DeKalb County, and the suit was
remanded to the trial court with instructions. 23
Id. at 85, 836 S.E.2d at 206.
Id. at 86, 836 S.E.2d at 207.
14 O.C.G.A. § 14-11-206(e)(1) (2020).
15 Andrews, 353 Ga. App. at 85, 836 S.E.2d at 206 (emphasis added) (2020).
16 Id. at 86, 836 S.E.2d at 207.
17 O.C.G.A. § 14-11-206(e)(2) (2020).
18 O.C.G.A. § 14-11-206(f) (2020).
19 Andrews, 353 Ga. App. at 86, 836 S.E.2d at 207.
20 O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-100 to 14-11-102 (2020).
21 Note that the same is true with respect to documents filed by corporations under the Georgia
Business Corporation Code. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-123 (2020).
22 353 Ga. App. at 84, 836 S.E.2d at 206.
23 Id. at 88, 836 S.E.2d at 208. Blue Ridge Associates and other defendants had alternatively
moved the trial court, on the basis of forum non conveniens under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1, to transfer
the suit to another county (Whitfield County) where venue was otherwise proper, and the trial
court granted that motion based in part on its conclusion that the suit lacked a sufficient connection
to DeKalb County because none of the defendants resided in DeKalb County. But the court of
appeals vacated that portion of the court’s order and remanded for reconsideration of the forum
12
13
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B. The Georgia Court of Appeals Holds that Managers of an LLC (who are also
Members) do not Breach Any Fiduciary Duties to LLC Members Simply by
Voting Their Membership Interests on a Matter Coming Before the
Members for a Vote of the Membership, and the Court Reiterates that
Non-Manager Members of a Manager-Managed LLC Owe No Fiduciary
Duties to the LLC or to its Members.
Suppose there is an LLC consisting of five members. In addition to owning
membership interests in the LLC, all five members are employed by the LLC,
and two of the members also serve as co-managers of the LLC. The LLC’s
operating agreement says that the fiduciary duties owed by the co-managers to
the LLC and to its members extend only to their acts (or omissions) taken (or
not taken) “in the management of” the Company, and no further. The operating
agreement permits the employment of the five members to be terminated for
cause or without cause, so long as at least a requisite percentage of the
membership interests held by the five members vote in favor of the
termination. Assume that four members vote to terminate the fifth member’s
employment, that the four members hold the votes necessary to take that action
under the operating agreement, and that the four voting members include the
two co-managers.
Now imagine that the member whose employment was terminated files suit
against all four members of the LLC, alleging, among other things, that the
members breached their fiduciary duties toward him by voting to terminate his
employment. Question: how should the terminated member’s fiduciary-duty
claims be resolved? Answer: the claims against the co-managers fail on the
merits, and the claims against the non-manager members fail to state a claim
for relief.
The court of appeals answered this question in Colquitt v. Buckhead Surgical
Associates, LLC.24 In January 2013, five medical doctors—Colquitt, Skandalakis,
Smith, McGill, and Procter—formed a medical practice, Buckhead Surgical
Associates, LLC (BSA), and an affiliated surgery center, Buckhead Surgery
Center, LLC (BSC). Skandalakis and Smith were appointed to serve as
co-managers of BSA and BSC. All five doctors, in addition to owning
membership interests in BSA, were employed by BSA. 25
About two and a half years later, Colquitt decided that he wanted to leave
the medical practice and, through counsel, sent a letter to McGill, Skandalakis,
Procter, and Smith, demanding a buyout of his membership interest in BSA. 26
non conveniens analysis, instructing the trial court to consider the fact that at least one defendant
resided in DeKalb County at the time the suit was filed.
24 351 Ga. App. 525, 831 S.E.2d 181 (2019).
25 Id. at 526, S.E.2d 181–83. It is not clear from the court’s opinion whether the five doctors were
also employed by BSC.
26 Id. at 526, 831 S.E.2d at 183. It is not clear from the court’s opinion whether Colquitt also
demanded a buyout of his membership interest in BSC, although presumably (note: author’s
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Four days later, however, McGill, Skandalakis, Procter, and Smith—in
accordance with the BSA operating agreement—voted their membership
interests in favor of terminating Colquitt’s employment with BSA. On the same
day they informed Colquitt that his employment had been terminated for cause
and that he no longer had access to the BSA premises or to its computer
system.27
Colquitt thereafter sued BSA, BSC, Skandalakis, Smith, McGill, and Procter,
alleging, among other things, claims against Skandalakis, Smith, McGill, and
Procter for breach of fiduciary duty. McGill and Procter moved under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-12(b)(6)28 to dismiss the fiduciary-duty claims against them for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 29 The trial court granted
both motions and dismissed the claims against McGill and Procter. Skandalakis
and Smith moved under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5630 for summary judgment on the
fiduciary-duty claims alleged against them. 31 The trial court granted both
motions and entered summary judgment for Skandalakis and Smith. Colquitt
appealed all four rulings.32 The court of appeals affirmed.33
With respect to the fiduciary-duty claims alleged against McGill and Procter,
the court of appeals noted that the LLC Act expressly provides that
non-manager members (like McGill and Procter) of a manager-managed LLC
(like BSA) do not owe any fiduciary duties to the LLC or to the LLC’s members.34
With respect to the fiduciary-duty claims alleged against Skandalakis and
Smith, the court of appeals first noted that the LLC Act authorizes members of
an LLC (either in the LLC’s articles of organization or in a written operating
agreement) to modify or restrict the scope of any fiduciary duties generally
owed by a manager to the LLC and its members. 35 The court then highlighted a
provision in the operating agreements of both BSA and BSC, which said that the
fiduciary duties of the co-managers could be based only on “acts or omissions
in the management of the Company.”36
The court concluded that Colquitt’s fiduciary-duty claims based on the
termination of his employment failed as a matter of law because Skandalakis
and Smith did not terminate Colquitt’s employment in their managerial
capacities (as co-managers of BSA) but rather in their capacities as voting
assumption) Colquitt would not be permitted to remain a member of BSC if he were no longer a
member of BSA.
27 Id.
28O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) (2020).
29 Colquitt, 351 Ga. App. at 526, 831 S.E.2d at 838.
30 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (2020).
31 Colquitt, 351 Ga. App. at 526, 831 S.E.2d at 838.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 531, 831 S.E.2d at 186.
34 Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305(1)).
35 Id. at 527, 831 S.E.2d at 183–84. See O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305(4)(A) (2020).
36 Colquitt, 351 Ga. App. at 528, 831 S.E.2d at 184.
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members of the LLC.37 In this regard, Skadalakis and Smith stood on the same
footing as McGill and Procter. 38 As the court put it: “[T]hey [Skandalakis and
Smith] simply participated in a vote—along with other members—to terminate
Colquitt’s employment. The act of voting was not an act in the management of
the company.”39 The court continued: “[U]nder the terms of the operating
agreement, participation in a member vote to terminate another member is not
deemed a managerial act or otherwise limited to the managing members; it was
instead an act that any member of the company was authorized to take.” 40 As a
result, and as a matter of law, “Smith and Skandalakis did not breach any
managerial fiduciary duty by merely taking action expressly authorized by the
operating agreement.”41
C. Applying Delaware Law, the Georgia Court of Appeals Holds that the
Chairman of a Board of Directors of an LLC, Who Also Holds the Majority of
Votes on the Board, Can be Liable for Breaching his Fiduciary Duties to the
LLC’s Minority Members by Unilaterally Refusing to Entertain Reasonable
Proposals to Buy the LLC, Even if the Proposals are not Binding Offers.
Suppose a person owns a minority interest in a five-member LLC organized
under Delaware law and that he is also the LLC’s chief executive officer. The
LLC is managed by a board of directors, and the chairman of the board, while
not a member of the LLC, holds a majority of the votes on the board under the
terms of the LLC’s operating agreement and thus effectively manages the LLC’s
affairs.
Now suppose that two private equity firms express to the board chairman
an interest in acquiring the LLC for several hundreds of millions of dollars. The
prospective acquirors engage in extensive due diligence and submit letters of
intent setting out the general terms of a proposed acquisition. Nevertheless, the
board chairman abruptly stops negotiating with both prospective acquirors
and terminates further discussions with them—all without consulting the
board of directors, the LLC’s CEO, or the LLC’s minority owners. Question: can
the board chairman be held liable for breaching his fiduciary duties to the
minority owners based on the way he negotiated with the prospective
acquirors, even though the letters of intent presented to him were not binding
and thus not capable of formal acceptance? Answer: yes.
The court of appeals answered this question in Miller v. Lynch (Miller II)42
which involved FiberLight, LLC (FiberLight), a company organized under
Id.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 529, 831 S.E.2d at 184.
42 351 Ga. App. 361, 830 S.E.2d 749 (2019). An earlier appeal arising out of the same suit came
before the court of appeals in 2017. See Miller v. FiberLight, LLC (Miller I), 343 Ga. App. 593, 808
37
38
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Delaware law that furnished fiberoptic services to technology companies and
consisted of five members—Michael Miller (about .5%); Kevin Coyne (about
.5%); Ron Kormos (about .5%); Thermo Telecom Partners, LLC (about 26%);
and NT Assets, LLC (about 72%).43 Miller was the chief executive officer of
FiberLight. Jim Lynch, not a member, served as chairman of FiberLight’s board
of directors. Under FiberLight’s operating agreement, Lynch was entitled to
exercise a majority of votes on the board and thus effectively controlled
FiberLight’s affairs.44
After FiberLight terminated his employment as CEO and reacquired his
membership interests, Miller sued Lynch and FiberLight’s majority owners,
alleging that they had, in three discrete ways, breached fiduciary duties owed
to Miller as a minority owner under Delaware law. 45 Miller alleged that one of
the ways in which Lynch had breached fiduciary duties owed to him was that
Lynch, without consulting or communicating with FiberLight’s minority
members or its board of directors, unilaterally rejected acquisition offers
submitted to FiberLight by two private equity firms—General Atlantic and
Summit, LLC—interested in purchasing FiberLight for several hundreds of
millions of dollars.46 The defendants moved for summary judgment on this
claim and argued that Lynch could not have formally accepted them because
the offers submitted to Lynch were not binding and that, as a result, Lynch’s
rejection did not breach any duty owed to Miller or the other minority owners.
Accepting that argument, the trial court granted summary judgment against
Miller on this fiduciary-duty claim (and on all his other claims).47 Miller
appealed the summary judgment entered against him and the court of appeals
reversed the grant of summary judgment on the fiduciary-duty claim based on
Lynch’s alleged rejection of the acquisition offers, concluding: “[W]e find that
whether the defendants rejected offers to purchase FiberLight, thereby
breaching default fiduciary duties, depends on disputed issues of material
fact.”48 Following the reversal, the case returned to the trial court, and Miller’s
fiduciary-duty claim based on Lynch’s negotiations with the two prospective
acquirors proceeded to trial.49
At trial, Miller testified that in April 2011, Lynch announced that a number
of prospective acquirors had submitted proposals to purchase FiberLight. One
S.E.2d 75 (2017). In Miller I, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and remanded the case for trial. At the close of the evidence at trial, the defendants
moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court granted, giving rise to Miller II, discussed in the
text above.
43 Miller I, 343 Ga. App. at 593, 595, 808 S.E.2d at 78, 79.
44 Id. at 593, 808 S.E.2d at 78.
45 Id. at 598, 808 S.E.2d at 81.
46 Id. at 605–06, 808 S.E.2d at 86.
47 Id. at 593, 606, 808 S.E.2d at 78, 86.
48 Id. at 606, 808 S.E.2d at 86.
49 See Miller II, 351 Ga. App. at 361–62, 830 S.E.2d at 751.
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proposal (for $325 million) was from a private equity firm called General
Atlantic, and one (for $320 million) was from a private equity firm called
Summit, LLC.50 General Atlantic submitted a nonbinding letter of intent in June
2011, which spelled out many details of the proposed transaction and
“explained the assumptions on which its valuation was based, its financing
arrangements, and the projected timing for the acquisition.” 51 Additionally,
“General Atlantic also indicated it had received investment committee
approval, subject to due diligence and ‘customary closing conditions.’” 52 Lynch
himself testified at trial that General Atlantic’s proposal was acceptable and
very strong.53 Nevertheless, in the middle of the negotiation process, Lynch sent
an e-mail to various FiberLight personnel saying that General Atlantic had
changed its offer price and that, as a result, we are done—meaning that Lynch
had terminated all further discussions with General Atlantic. 54 Miller testified
at trial that Lynch did not tell Miller, the board, or the other minority members
the amount of the reduced price offered by General Atlantic or otherwise
consult with them about terminating the negotiations. 55
Like General Atlantic, Summit also submitted a letter of intent outlining its
proposal to acquire FiberLight.56 Summit’s letter of intent, like General
Atlantic’s, “presented an investment summary and identified its source of funds
for the acquisition and anticipated closing conditions.”57 But again, Lynch, in
the middle of the negotiation process, told FiberLight personnel that Summit
had changed its offer price and that, as a result, “we’re not going forward with
it”—meaning that, as with General Atlantic, Lynch had unilaterally scuttled
further negotiations and terminated all discussions with Summit. 58 And as
before, Lynch did not consult Miller, the board, or the other minority members
before terminating the negotiations with Summit.59
At the close of the evidence, the defendants moved for a directed verdict,
echoing their earlier summary-judgment arguments, again asserting that they
were entitled to prevail on Miller’s fiduciary-duty claim because the evidence
presented at trial established that the offers submitted by General Atlantic and
Summit were nonbinding (and therefore not capable of acceptance). The
defendants contended that if the offers were incapable of being formally
accepted, then failing to accept them could not, as a matter of law, have

Id. at 362–63, 830 S.E.2d at 752.
Id. at 363, 830 S.E.2d at 752.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 363, 365, 830 S.E.2d at 752–53.
56 Id. at 363, 830 S.E.2d at 752.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 365, 830 S.E.2d at 753.
50
51
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constituted a breach of any fiduciary duty.60 Accepting that argument, the trial
court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, finding that “because there
was no ‘binding offer,’ there was nothing to accept, and, resultantly, there was
no breach.”61 Miller appealed that ruling (and others).62
The court of appeals, based on the evidence presented at trial and on
Miller’s theory of the case, disagreed with the trial court’s narrow view of what
could qualify as a breach of fiduciary duty. 63 The court of appeals acknowledged
that Miller’s complaint highlighted Lynch’s rejection of at least one offer as
evidence of his breach of duty and also acknowledged that Miller “did not
specifically allege a theory regarding terminated sale negotiations.” 64
Nevertheless, the court observed that Miller consistently argued throughout
the trial that it was not simply Lynch’s failure to accept binding offers that
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. 65 Rather, Miller insisted more broadly
that Lynch breached his fiduciary duty by failing to negotiate in good faith with
General Atlantic and Summit, as evidenced by Lynch’s unilateral termination of
the negotiations without consulting the board or FiberLight’s members. 66
Miller, the court stressed, “repeatedly contended that [Lynch] breached
fiduciary duties to him by shutting down or cutting off negotiations with the
companies that had demonstrated interest in purchasing FiberLight” and that
“Lynch made such decisions without consulting either the board of directors or
FiberLight’s minority owners.”67 Although this bad-faith-negotiation theory
was not specifically articulated in Miller’s complaint, the court nevertheless
permitted Miller’s pursuit of this broader theory at trial because it was
generally consistent with his complaint and because the defendants did not
claim or demonstrate that they were in any way prejudiced by Miller’s focus on
the nature of the negotiations rather than on the mere rejection of the
proposals.68
The court noted that under Delaware law “one who manages an LLC can
breach fiduciary duties to minority members of the LLC by his ‘failure to
negotiate with an interested buyer in good faith—this conduct is governed by
traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.’” 69 And because the trial record
revealed that there was “evidence at trial, however slight, that Lynch was not
negotiating with interested buyers [General Atlantic and Summit] in good

Id. at 364, 830 S.E.2d at 753.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 366, 830 S.E.2d at 754.
64 Id. at 365, 830 S.E.2d at 754.
65 Id. at 365, 830 S.E.2d at 753–54.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 365, 80 S.E.2d at 753.
68 Id. at 365, 830 S.E.2d at 754.
69 Id. at 365, 830 S.E.2d at 753 (citations and brackets omitted).
60
61
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faith,”70 the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in directing a
verdict for the defendants on Miller’s fiduciary-duty claim and thus reversed
the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 71
D. The Georgia Court of Appeals Confirms that a Shareholder who Votes Against
a Corporate Acquisition but who Does Not Pursue His Dissenters’ Rights
Remedy is Barred From Thereafter Suing the Corporation, its Board of
Directors, and its Officers to Challenge the Acquisition or the Value of the
Acquisition Consideration Based on Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty,
Breach of Contract, and Fraudulent Misrepresentation.
Suppose you are a shareholder of a target corporation that is entertaining
two competing acquisition proposals. Under one proposal (Proposal A), which
values the target corporation at $47.5 million, the acquiror would purchase a
56% equity ownership interest in the target and all the shareholders of the
target would retain their shares in the corporation. Under the other proposal
(Proposal B), which values the target corporation at $45 million, the acquiror
would purchase a 63% equity ownership interest in the target, most of the
target’s shareholders would receive cash consideration in exchange for selling
their shares, and only a select few of the target’s shareholders (but not you)
would retain their shares in the corporation. You prefer Proposal A over
Proposal B.
Now suppose that the board of directors of the target corporation votes to
pursue Proposal B, under which your shares are cashed out, and you will have
no further ownership. The shareholders vote in favor of Proposal B. You vote
against it because you are dissatisfied with the value you will be paid for your
shares, but you take no further action and the acquisition is consummated.
Afterward, you sue the corporation, the chief executive officer, the board
members, and various of the employees, alleging, among others, claims for
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation
arising out of the acquisition. Question: can you maintain these claims in this
lawsuit? Answer: no, the claims are barred because you failed to comply with
the dissenters’ rights statute—which provides that your sole and exclusive
remedy is to be paid the fair value of your shares, either through an agreement
with the corporation or by means of a summary court proceeding initiated for

Id. at 366, 830 S.E.2d at 754.
Id. The defendants raised other defenses to the fiduciary-duty claim, including that Lynch’s
decisions to terminate negotiations with General Atlantic and Summit were insulated by the
business judgment rule, that Miller’s claims were barred by an exculpatory clause in FiberLight’s
operating agreement, and that Miller could not prove any damages resulting from the alleged
breach. The directed verdict in favor of the defendants effectively mooted those arguments, which,
as a result, the trial court did not address. The court of appeals declined to address those arguments
in the first instance, concluding (interestingly) that the circumstances did not warrant applying the
usual rule that a judgment should be affirmed on appeal if it is right for any reason.
70
71
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that sole purpose—and your claims do not fall within any exception to the
statute’s exclusive-remedy provision.
SDM Investments Group, LLC v. HBN Media, Inc.72 involved a company called
HBN Media, Inc. (HBN), which was incorporated in 2010 by Duane LeGate, who
became its CEO. In 2011, SDM Investment Group, LLC (SDM) invested $22,000
into HBN to become one of its founding shareholders. HBN experienced
liquidity problems from the outset, and by 2014 LeGate had hired an
investment bank to help find an acquiror to buy HBN.73
In June 2014, HBN received an offer from Serent Capital, L.P. (Serent) to
acquire 62.9% of HBN’s outstanding stock. Under the proposal, many of HBN’s
existing shareholders would receive cash in exchange for their shares, but three
shareholders—LeGate and two others, but not SDM—would be allowed to
retain their shares in HBN after Serent’s acquisition of its controlling interest.
Serent valued HBN at $45 million and proposed to pay HBN’s shareholders
approximately $33 million as consideration for Serent’s controlling interest. 74
But Serent’s offer was not the only one presented to HBN’s board of
directors. Another firm, Frontier Capital, also submitted a proposal to acquire
a controlling interest in HBN. Frontier Capital valued HBN at $47.5 million and
proposed to acquire 56.3% of HBN’s outstanding stock, while allowing all of
HBN’s existing shareholders—including SDM—to retain their shares in HBN
and to continue as HBN shareholders after Frontier Capital’s acquisition. 75
After considering both proposals, HBN’s board of directors voted to pursue
the one presented by Serent. HBN’s board sent a letter to HBN’s shareholders,
which explained the terms of Serent’s proposal and recommended a vote in
favor of it. HBN’s shareholders voted in favor of Serent’s proposal, and SDM
voted against it but took no further action with respect to the transaction. Less
than two years after Serent acquired its interest in HBN, Fidelity National
Financial, Inc. acquired HBN for nearly $230 million. 76
Shortly after HBN’s acquisition by Fidelity National, SDM (whose shares in
HBN were cashed out before the sale to Fidelity) sued HBN, LeGate, and a
number of other HBN officers and employees, alleging claims for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation. In
particular, SDM alleged that Serent’s acquisition resulted in the unfair dilution
of SDM’s stock ownership in HBN and that LeGate and other board members
committed fraud and made material misrepresentations concerning the terms
of the transaction and the amount of money that SDM received for its shares.

353 Ga. App. 281, 836 S.E.2d 193 (2019).
Id. at 282, 836 S.E.2d at 194–95.
74 Id. at 282, 836 S.E.2d at 195.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 282–83, 836 S.E.2d at 195.
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The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted
summary judgment for them on all of SDM’s claims.77
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, concluding that SDM
was barred from pursing any of its claims because it had not complied with the
exclusive remedy available to it: the demand for payment of the fair value of its
shares under O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1301 to 14-2-1332,78 the dissenters’ rights
statute. 79 What does this mean, and why is it an important principle of
corporate law to know?
First, a little background. Certain corporate actions—listed in O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-1302(a)(1)80—create in a minority shareholder who opposes the action
the right to dissent from it, vote against it, tender his shares for sale to the
corporation, and receive payment for the fair value of those shares.81 This is the
objecting shareholder’s sole remedy. He cannot block the transaction. As the
comments to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302 explain:
The theory underlying [the dissenters’ rights statute] is as follows: when a
majority of shareholders has approved a corporate change, the corporation
should be permitted to proceed even if a minority considers the change
unwise or disadvantageous . . . . Since dissenting shareholders can obtain the
fair value of their shares, they are protected from pecuniary loss. 82

If a dissenting shareholder follows the procedural steps prescribed by the
statute but is dissatisfied with and rejects the value that the corporation
proposes to pay for his tendered shares, then the corporation is thereafter
required to commence in the superior court where its registered agent is
located “a nonjury equitable valuation proceeding” 83 in which the court must
determine and then enter a “judgment for the amount which the court finds to
be the fair value of [the shareholder’s] shares, plus interest to the date of
judgment.”84
Except in three narrow circumstances,85 the right of a dissenting
shareholder to be paid the “fair value” of his shares (whether through
Id. at 283–84, 836 S.E.2d at 195–96.
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1301 to 14-2-1332 (2020).
79 SDM Investments Group, LLC, 353 Ga. App. at 284, 836 S.E.2d at 196.
80 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302(a)(1) (2020). “Subsection (a) [of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302] establishes the
scope of a shareholder’s right to dissent (and his resulting right to obtain payment for his shares)
by defining the transactions with respect to which a right to dissent exists.” Cmt. to O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-1302 (2020).
81 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1323(c); O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1325(a) (2020).
82 Cmt. to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302 (2020).
83 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1330(b) (2020).
84 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1330(e) (2020).
85 The three circumstances are: (1) the failure of the corporation to comply with the procedural
requirements of the Georgia Business Corporation Code; (2) the failure of the corporation to
comply with its bylaws or its articles of incorporation; and (3) the use of fraudulent and deceptive
77
78
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negotiation with the corporation or through the judicial appraisal proceeding)
is the shareholder’s sole and exclusive remedy, meaning that a shareholder is
barred from filing a lawsuit against the corporation or its officers to challenge
the corporate action that created his right to dissent. 86 This exclusivity
principle spelled the death of SDM’s lawsuit against HBN and LeGate. 87
In affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against SDM, the
court of appeals characterized all of SDM’s claims as “simply attacks on the
price SDM ultimately received for its shares and/or the terms of the buyout,
rather than claims for actual fraud that would have allowed it to circumvent the
exclusive remedy of the dissenters’ rights statute.”88 SDM’s claims, in other
words, did not fall within any exception to the statutory bar on lawsuits
challenging merger transactions. In so concluding, the court of appeals applied
the following practical rule announced by the Georgia Supreme Court in Grace
Bros., Ltd. v. Farley Industries, Inc.:89 if a shareholder’s claim, at bottom, is simply
that he “would have been paid more money per share if defendants had not
breached their fiduciary duty to seek consummation of the merger
agreement”90—or, stated differently, if his claim “boils down to nothing more
than a complaint about stock price”91—then the shareholder’s exclusive
remedy is the appraisal process set forth in the dissenters’ rights statute and he
is barred from challenging the merger in a separate lawsuit. 92 Because SDM

means to obtain the shareholder vote necessary to approve the corporate action. See O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-1302(b). The comments to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302 underscore the exclusivity of the dissenters’
rights statutory provisions: “Subsection (b) establishes dissenters’ rights as the exclusive remedy of
this article . . . . [T]he fact that the merger might be argued to be unlawful as a breach of the
directors’ duty of care is not ground for equitable relief at the instance of a shareholder. The
dissenters’ rights remedy is the exclusive remedy unless the transaction is not in compliance with
the requirements of the Code, or the vote required to approve the action was obtained by
fraudulent and deceptive means.” (emphasis added).
86 Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Farley Industries, Inc., 264 Ga. 817, 820–21, 450 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1994)
(“The statutory appraisal remedy is exclusive . . . . It permits a dissenting shareholder to be paid the
fair value of his shares and preempts any other remedy where the claim is essentially one regarding
the price the shareholder is to receive for his shares.”).
87 See SDM Investment Group, LLC, 353 Ga. App. 281, 836 S.E.2d 193.
88 Id. 353 Ga. App. at 284, 836 S.E.2d at 196.
89 264 Ga. 817, 450 S.E.2d 814 (1994).
90 Id. at 821, 450 S.E.2d at 817.
91 Id.
92 The 1989 comments to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302 emphasize that the so-called fraud exception to
the exclusive remedy of the fair value appraisal process—that “the vote required to obtain approval
of the corporate action was obtained by fraudulent and deceptive means,” O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-1302(b)—requires “‘actual fraud,’ involving traditional notions of deception, [to] permit[]
[a] collateral attack on the corporate action.” But “claims that a fiduciary has acted unfairly” are not
sufficient, according to the comments, “to litigate valuation issues that are appropriately disposed
of in appraisal proceedings.” See Grace Bros. Ltd., 264 Ga. at 820 n.11, 450 S.E.2d at 817 n.11.
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failed to exercise its dissenters’ rights, the claims it later alleged against SDM,
LeGate, and others failed as a matter of law. 93
E. The Georgia Court of Appeals Holds that Members who Formerly Owned a
Controlling Interest in an LLC May Pursue a Direct (Rather than Derivative)
Action Against an LLC Manager who is Alleged to Have Breached His
Fiduciary Duties by Intentionally Diluting the Members’ Controlling
Interest by Improper Means.
Suppose that Carl and his business partner, Tom, form an LLC to provide
medical devices to low-income customers. You and Tom own a controlling
interest in the company, and Tom serves as its sole manager. In need of cash for
the growing company, Carl solicits loans from an acquaintance and successful
entrepreneur, Bill, who promises to loan money to the LLCs until they are in a
position to be sold to an acquiror for tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.
After Bill acquires an ownership interest in the company, however, he concocts
an elaborate scheme to seize control of the company from Carl and Tom, to
benefit himself personally at the expense of Carl and Tom (but not other
members of the company), and removes Tom as a manager of the company
through deceptive means.
Question: if, as a result of Bill’s conduct, Carl and Tom sue Bill for breaching
the company’s operating agreement and for breaching the fiduciary duties
imposed on Bill as a manager of the company, can Carl and Tom pursue those
claims in a direct action in their names for their individual benefit, or must they
assert them in a derivative action in the name of the company for the benefit of
the company and, indirectly, all the company’s members? Answer: because the
harms suffered by Carl and Tom are distinct from any harms to the company
itself and were not suffered by all the company’s members, Carl and Tom may
pursue the claims individually in a direct action for their own benefit.
The court of appeals answered this question in TMX Finance, LLC v.
Goldsmith.94 Dr. Manning M. Goldsmith, III formed ICOT Hearing Systems, LLC
(ICOT Hearing) to provide inexpensive hearing aids to consumers. Goldsmith’s
business partner, Jason Jue, served as the sole manager of ICOT Hearing. ICOT
Hearing was a wholly owned subsidiary of ICOT Holdings, LLC (ICOT Holdings),
a company in which Goldsmith and Jue owned a majority ownership interest. 95
Goldsmith and Jue wanted to accelerate the growth of the ICOT companies
so that they could be sold for tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, but they

SDM Investment Group, LLC, 353 Ga. App. at 197, 836 S.E.2d at 284.
352 Ga. App. 190, 833 S.E.2d 317 (2019).The appeal was from the denial of the defendants’
motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint (or, alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings). The
facts recounted in the text above (and in the opinion of the court of appeals) are as alleged in the
plaintiffs’ complaint because in resolving motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the
pleadings, courts must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint.
95 Id. at 190–91, 833 S.E.2d at 321–22.
93
94
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knew that in order to do so the companies would require more money than they
were currently generating. For financial help they turned to Tracy Young, the
founder of a family of title-pawn companies (TitleMax, etc.) and other
businesses. In August 2015, Young began loaning money to the ICOT
companies, and Young assured Goldsmith and Jue that he would continue doing
so.96
In March 2016, Goldsmith, Jue, Young, and Young’s limited liability
company, TY ICOT Investments, LLC (TY Investments), entered into a written
agreement under which Young agreed to loan additional money to the ICOT
companies and to secure two existing bank loans to ICOT Hearing in exchange
for the acquisition by TY Investments of membership units in ICOT Holdings
and the acquisition by TY Investments of options to buy additional membership
units in ICOT Holdings in the future. Goldsmith and Jue still retained a majority
ownership interest in ICOT Holdings although Young (through TY Investments)
became a member of ICOT Holdings.97 At the same time, an amended operating
agreement for ICOT Holdings was signed, under which the affairs of ICOT
Holdings would be managed by a three-member board of managers. Under the
operating agreement, Jue and Young would serve as two of the three managers
and the third would be proposed by Jue and approved by TY Investments.98
In October 2016, two reputable firms each expressed a willingness to invest
capital into ICOT Holdings—thereby improving its financial condition—but
Young derailed conversations with those firms because he knew that doing so
would cause the liquidity problems that the ICOT companies experienced to
persist. Still in need of money to fund the operations of the ICOT companies
while a potential sale could be negotiated (for a purchase price between $100
million and $250 million), ICOT Holdings arranged to execute a significant line
of credit from United Community Bank. Although both Jue and Young had
agreed to personally guarantee the repayment of the line of credit, Young
refused to sign his personal guaranty agreement unless Goldsmith and Jue
agreed for ICOT Holdings to issue Young warrants to buy additional
membership units in ICOT Holdings.99
After Goldsmith and Jue refused to issue Young warrants that, if exercised,
would increase his ownership interest in ICOT Holdings, Young attended a
dinner with the potential acquiror of ICOT Holdings and spoke poorly about the
financial condition of ICOT Holdings, thereby causing the potential acquiror to
break off further negotiations. Meanwhile, Young insisted that personnel of his
title-pawn companies be permitted to inspect the books and financial records
of the ICOT companies, not to improve the financial health of the ICOT
companies but instead because he wanted his personnel to gain familiarity with
Id. at 191, 833 S.E.2d at 322.
Id. at 191–92, 833 S.E.2d at 322–23.
98 Id. at 192, 833 S.E.2d at 323.
99 Id. at 192–93, 833 S.E.2d at 323.
96
97
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the internal workings of the companies so that they could run them after Young
seized control of the companies from Goldsmith and Jue. 100
To further his takeover attempt, Young proposed that his friend, Robert
Pirkle, serve as the third member of the three-person board of managers of
ICOT Holdings. Young persuaded Jue to accept Pirkle’s appointment under false
pretenses, telling Jue (falsely) that United Community Bank had conditioned
the line of credit on the appointment of Pirkle. Believing it was critical for ICOT
Holdings to get the line of credit in place, Jue agreed to Pirkle’s appointment. 101
Shortly after Pirkle had been appointed to serve as a manager of ICOT
Holdings, Young and Pirkle voted to terminate Jue as a manager of ICOT
Hearing. As a result, Jue immediately resigned as manager of ICOT Holdings.
Young and Pirkle voted, as managers of ICOT Holdings, to issue a $6 million
capital call to all members of ICOT Holdings. In accordance with that capital call,
each member of ICOT Holdings was required to invest additional money into
ICOT Holdings (in exchange for receiving additional membership units) pro
rata according to his existing ownership percentage. If a member chose not to
meet the capital call, his ownership percentage would be diluted, and the
ownership percentages of those members who did contribute additional capital
would be correspondingly increased.102
At the time the capital call was announced, Young knew that Goldsmith and
Jue did not have the financial wherewithal to meet it and that, as a result, their
ownership interests in ICOT Holdings would be diluted to virtually nothing as
a result. Young and some other members of ICOT Holdings met the capital call.
As predicted, Goldsmith and Jue did not. As a result of Young’s infusion of
capital, he acquired control of ICOT Holdings and, indirectly, of ICOT Hearing—
divesting Goldsmith and Jue of the controlling interest they once held. Shortly
after acquiring control of the ICOT companies by squeezing out Goldsmith and
Jue, Young reinitiated conversations with the potential acquiror he had earlier
shunned, this time offering to sell the ICOT companies for $40 million. 103
Goldsmith and Jue sued Young, TY Investments, and a number of other
businesses owned by Young, alleging claims for breach of contract (the ICOT
Holdings operating agreement), breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud (among
others). They filed the suit as a direct action—meaning that they filed it in their
own names seeking damages to compensate them for injuries they personally
suffered. They did not bring it as a derivative action on behalf of ICOT Holdings
and ICOT Hearing because, in their view, the harms they alleged were not
harms suffered by the companies or by all its members. 104

Id. at 193–94, 833 S.E.2d at 323–24.
Id. at 194, 833 S.E.2d at 324.
102 Id. at 194–95, 833 S.E.2d at 324–25.
103 Id. at 195–96, 833 S.E.2d at 325.
104 Id. at 196, 833 S.E.2d at 326. Disputes about whether plaintiffs may bring direct actions
against corporate directors and officers or are instead required to sue them in derivative actions
100
101
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Young and TY Investments moved to dismiss the complaint against them,
arguing that “the plaintiffs had failed to plead special injuries entitling them to
pursue a direct rather than a derivative action on behalf of ICOT Holdings” and
that:
the plaintiffs failed to allege any injuries they sustained that were different
from other members of ICOT Holdings, and thus they were required to
adhere to the procedural requirements for filing a derivative action under
the Georgia Limited Liability Company Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-100 to
14-11-102, which the plaintiffs failed to allege they had done.105

The trial court denied the motion, and Young and TY Investments succeeded
in petitioning for an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. 106
Whether claims against corporate directors and officers may be brought in
a direct action or whether they must be brought in a derivative action turns on
the particular injuries alleged in the complaint. 107 The court of appeals thus
began its analysis by noting that Goldsmith and Jue alleged in their complaint
that “they held a controlling interest in ICOT Holdings, but that Young then
ousted them from control by orchestrating an unnecessary funding crisis in
breach of his fiduciary duties as a manager of ICOT Holdings and through false
representations and omissions about funding and other matters.” 108
The general rule, the court noted, is that these kinds of harms—dilution of
ownership and voting power—are not unique to individual members but are
instead suffered alike by all members “‘where the interests of all the
shareholders [are] diminished in proportion to their ownership,’” meaning that
claims alleging these kinds of harms must ordinarily be brought in a derivative
action.109 The court then explained that an exception to that general rule
applies “‘in the case where wrongdoers by fraud have seized control of the
corporation from the complaining stockholders,’” in which case
“‘[s]tockholders may maintain an action on an individual basis, as distinguished
from a derivative action, against directors, officers, or others for the redress of
wrongs constituting a direct fraud upon them.’” 110 The court determined that
are routinely litigated. See, e.g., Stuart E. Walker, Business Associations, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 15, 23–30 (2019); Stuart E. Walker, Business Associations, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 19, 38–46 (2018).
105 Id. at 196–97, 833 S.E.2d at 326.
106 Id. at 190, 833 S.E.2d at 321.
107 “[T]he determination of whether a claim is derivative or direct is made by ‘looking to what
the pleader alleged’ . . . [because] it is ‘the nature of the wrong alleged and not the pleader’s
designation or stated intention that controls the court’s decision.’” Patel v. 2602 Deerfield, LLC, 347
Ga. App. 880, 884, 819 S.E.2d 527, 532 (2018) (citations and internal quote marks omitted).
108 TMX Finance, LLC, at 197, 833 S.E.2d at 326.
109 Id. at 197–98, 833 S.E.2d at 326.
110 Id. at 198, 833 S.E.2d at 326 (quoting Gieselmann v. Stegeman, 443 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo.
1969)). The court cited secondary sources and primary sources from a number of foreign
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the intentional seizure of control of ICOT Holdings from Goldsmith and Jue is
the situation alleged here and concluded that:
because of [Goldsmith’s and Jue’s] loss of control resulting from the alleged
breach of fiduciary duties and fraud specifically targeted at them by Young,
the alleged harm to [Goldsmith and Jue] was different from that experienced
by ICOT Holdings and its minority members, and [they] thus sufficiently pled
a special injury.111

In addition to alleging fiduciary-duty claims, Goldsmith and Jue based their
direct action against Young and TY Investments on claims for breach of contract
and wrongful termination: Goldsmith alleged that Young breached the written
agreement under which TY Investments became a member of ICOT Holdings
and Jue alleged that he was wrongfully terminated as a manager of ICOT
Hearing.112 These claims, the court of appeals determined, alleged injuries
unique to Goldsmith and Jue individually and thus were not required to be
brought in a derivative action.113
Based on its review of the nature of the allegations in Goldsmith’s and Jue’s
complaint, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to
dismiss.114
III. AMENDMENTS TO THE GEORGIA BUSINESS CORPORATION CODE AND THE GEORGIA
NONPROFIT CORPORATION CODE.
A. The Business Corporation Code is Amended to Authorize the Creation of
Benefit Corporations.
During the 2020 legislative session, the General Assembly passed (and
Governor Kemp has since signed into law) House Bill 230, 115 which amends
Chapter 2 of Title 14 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (the Georgia
Business Corporation Code) to authorize the organization of a new kind of
for-profit corporation under Georgia law: the benefit corporation.
Benefit corporations were first authorized by legislation enacted in the
State of Maryland in 2010 and in the past decade similar laws have been
enacted in thirty-seven states and in Washington, D.C., according to the most

jurisdictions to support its holding that corporate shareholders and LLC members may bring direct
actions against those officers or managers who have, by fraudulent means or by breach of their
fiduciary duties, wrested control of the corporation or LLC away from them. Id. at 198 n.2, 833
S.E.2d at 327 n.2 (collecting authorities).
111 Id. at 198, 833 S.E.2d at 327.
112 Id. at 199, 833 S.E.2d at 327.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 214, 833 S.E.2d at 336.
115 Ga. H.R. Bill 230, Reg. Sess. (2020).
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recent statistics available.116 Benefit corporations are for-profit companies
obligated by statute to meet strict standards of social and environmental
performance, accountability, and transparency. Although they may seem like
non-profit corporations in some respects, they are not operated solely for
charitable purposes, and their for-profit status allows them to attract capital
investment unavailable to non-profit corporations. Examples of well-known
benefit corporations include Patagonia, Ben & Jerry’s, Kickstarter, Warby
Parker, and New Belgium Brewing.
Under the new sections of the Georgia Business Corporation Code—O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-1801117—a benefit corporation is a for-profit corporation whose
articles of incorporation state that it is a benefit corporation and that one of its
purposes is to pursue a public benefit. 118 A public benefit, in turn, is defined to
mean
a positive effect, or reduction of negative effects, on society, on the
environment, or on one or more communities or categories of persons,
entities, or interests, other than shareholders in their capacity as
shareholders, including effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic,
ecological, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific,
social, or technological nature.119

A benefit corporation may identify itself as such by including as part of its
corporate name the words benefit corporation or public benefit corporation or
the abbreviations “BC” or “PBC.”120 To the extent not inconsistent with the
provisions of newly enacted Article 18, all provisions of the Business
Corporation Code apply to benefit corporations. 121
An existing traditional for-profit corporation may amend its articles of
incorporation to become a benefit corporation, may transfer its property to a
benefit corporation, may engage in a merger or share exchange with a benefit
corporation, and may sell all or substantially all of its assets to a benefit
corporation; but none of these actions is permissible unless first approved by a
two-thirds vote of each class or series of shares of the traditional for-profit
corporation—with each class or series voting as a separate voting group—even
if the shares do not otherwise have voting rights.122 Likewise, an existing
benefit corporation may amend its articles of incorporation to delete or modify

State by State Status of Legislation, Benefit Corporation,
https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status?state= (last visited August 11,
2020).
117 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1801 (2020).
118 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1802(3) (2020).
119 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1802(2) (2020).
120 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1803 (2020).
121 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1801(a) (2020).
122 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1805(a) (2020).
116
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its public-benefit provision and may engage of in any of the just-described
transactions with a traditional for-profit corporation, subject to the same
voting requirements by its shareholders.123 It is worth noting that the actions
described in this paragraph—whether taken by a traditional or a benefit
corporation—create dissenters’ rights under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302.124
In addition to the duties generally imposed on them by the Georgia Business
Corporation Code, directors of a benefit corporation have a duty to consider the
corporation’s public benefit when managing or directing the corporation’s
affairs and a duty to adopt a standard by which to measure the corporation’s
performance in pursing the public benefit identified in its articles of
incorporation;125 but the directors do not owe those duties to persons who
merely have an interest in the public benefit and the directors generally have
no financial liability for failing to pursue the corporation’s public benefit or for
failing to consider the benefit or adopt the statutorily required standard by
which to measure the corporation’s performance.126
At least once a year, a benefit corporation must send a report to its
shareholders, and to any other person who requests one, that addresses the
corporation’s performance in pursuing the public benefit in its articles of
incorporation. The report must also include the following information: (a) the
objectives adopted by the corporation to achieve its public benefit; (b) the
standards adopted to measure the corporation’s progress in pursing the public
benefit; (c) the facts related to the corporation’s success or failure in pursuing
the public benefit; and (d) an assessment of the corporation’s success or failure
in meeting its objectives.127 A benefit corporation may, but is not required to,
undertake additional duties with respect to its reporting obligations. 128
Time will tell how many corporations incorporated under Georgia law will
take advantage of the ability to organize as a benefit corporation, but the
national trend appears to show a steady increase in the popularity of these
kinds of socially conscious and culturally aware corporations.
B. The Nonprofit Corporation Code is Amended to Revise and Strengthen the
Business Judgment Rule Applicable to Officers and Directors of Nonprofit
Corporations.
During the 2020 legislative session, the General Assembly also passed (and
Governor Kemp has since signed into law) Senate Bill 373, 129 which amends
Chapter 3 of Title 14 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (the Georgia
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1805(b) (2020).
See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302(a)(5) (2020).
125 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1806(a)(3) (2020).
126 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1806(b) (2020).
127 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1807(b) (2020).
128 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1807(c) (2020).
129 Ga. S. Bill 373, Reg. Sess. (2020).
123
124
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Nonprofit Corporation Code) to do three main things. First, the statute brings
the standards of care for directors130 and officers131 of non-profit corporations
into line with those that apply to directors 132 and officers133 of for-profit
corporations. Second, the statute provides that all decisions of directors and
officers are rebuttably presumed to have been made in good faith, in the
exercise of reasonable care, and that the presumption can be rebutted only with
evidence that the director or officer committed gross negligence by grossly
deviating from the reasonableness standard of care. 134 Finally, the statute
overhauls and clarifies the various sources of information that directors and
officers may properly rely on in performing their duties. 135
IV. THE GEORGIA STATE-WIDE BUSINESS COURT
The Georgia State-wide Business Court—created by an amendment to
Article VI of the Georgia Constitution,136 ratified by Georgia voters in November
2018, and by enabling legislation passed by the General Assembly during the
2019 legislative session137—began accepting its first cases on August 1,
2020.138 To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no publicly available
information about the filing statistics of the new court.
The first and (so far) only judge of the new court—Judge Walter W. Davis,
appointed by Governor Kemp and approved by the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees—has, in consultation with an eight-member commission,
prepared and sent to the Georgia Supreme Court for review and approval a set
of rules to govern the conduct of the court and the litigants and counsel who
will practice before it.139 On May 29, 2020, the court’s proposed rules were
posted to the website of the supreme court, and public comments were invited
to be submitted to the supreme court by June 15, 2020. 140 As of this writing
(August 2020) the rules have not been finalized. The Uniform Superior Court
Rules will govern the procedures of the court on an interim basis, in accordance
with an order issued by Chief Justice Harold Melton on July 31, 2020. 141

O.C.G.A. § 14-3-830(a) (2020).
O.C.G.A. § 14-3-842(a) (2020).
132 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(a).
133 O.C.G.A. § 14-2-842(a).
134 O.C.G.A. § 14-3-830(c) (2020); O.C.G.A. § 14-3-842(c) (2020).
135 O.C.G.A. § 14-3-830(b) (2020); O.C.G.A. § 14-3-842(b) (2020).
136 GA. CONST. art. VI. § 3, para. 2.
137 See O.C.G.A. §§ 15-5A-1 to15-5A-16 (2020).
138 O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-6(b) (2020).
139 O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-10(a), (b) (2020).
140 Supreme Court of Georgia Solicits Comments on Proposed New Georgia State-wide Business
Court Rules, Supreme Court of Georgia
https://www.gasupreme.us/proposed-new-uniform-rules/ (last visited August 11, 2020).
141 Administrative Minutes July 31, 2020, Supreme Court of Georgia
130
131

42

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

https://www.gasupreme.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Business_court_interim_rules_order_as_issued.pdf (last visited August
11, 2020).

